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THE NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY:
REAFFIRMING ETHICAL "FIRST THINGS"
J. Daryl Charlest
Abstract
The truth about nature and natural revelation matters. While government
cannot impose by decree moral truth, this truth should nevertheless be debated
in the public square, if for no other reason, it is intuited by all human beings.
The alternative is an unhuman--and inhumane-consensus of "choice" and
degradation of life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people have heard, in one form or another, the wonderfully prescient
story-perhaps apocryphal-of the student who submitted to his professor a
paper under the title "There is No Such Thing As Justice."' Without so much
as a single marginal comment or concluding evaluation, the professor returned
the paper to the student with a failing grade. Outraged, the student went to see
the professor-the requisite step, of course, before lodging an academic protest
against injustice with the dean-and proceeded to plead his case, seeking to
convince the professor of how hard he had worked on the paper. Not only did
the professor proffer no counter-argument, he readily conceded that this was
one of the better papers he had received in his many years of teaching. As a
matter of fact, he stated, so powerful was the student's argument that the
professor in the end was forced to agree, in which case, the professor
announced, "there is no such thing as justice, so quit your whining!" 2
It goes without saying that our culture, like the student, will need to make up
its mind. Either there are fixed, non-fluid-and therefore, universal-norms
forjustice, right and wrong, to which human beings, regardless of their place in
history, are held accountable, or there are not. At the practical level, G.K.
Chesterton put the matter in perspective: people differ less about what things
t Senior Fellow in the Center of Religion & Politics, Union University, 2007-08 William
E. Simon Visiting Fellow in Religion & Public Life, James Madison Program in American
Ideals and Institutions, Department of Politics, Princeton University. Beginning Fall 2009, the
author will serve as director and senior fellow, Bryan Institute for Critical Thought and Practice,
Bryan College. This article was originally published in LIFE AND LEARNING XVI 321-71 (Joseph
W. Koterski ed. 2007).
1. More recently this illustration appeared in ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF
ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS, at ix (2001).
2. Author's paraphrase.
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 607 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
they call evil (although they indeed disagree) than about what evils they are
willing to excuse. Chesterton, I think, is on to something; nevertheless, when
basics become blurred, one must begin with first things. Are there moral first
principles-the "permanent" things-to which the natural law and human
moral discernment point us? If there are, then we shall have the means by
which to find our bearings amidst a morally obtuse and radically skeptical
generation. Indeed, the Christian moral tradition historically has affirmed these
ethical "first things'-what Aquinas reduced to "do good and avoid evil" and
from which all other moral norms derive. The Christian moral tradition
assumes the presence in all human beings of a basic moral intuition.
Unhappily, particularly among Protestants (among whom I number myself),
there exists a serious neglect-if not an outright disavowal-of the natural law
in contemporary Christian ethics. But in the context of difficult, knotty, and
critically urgent ethical and bioethical issues, the natural law will need to serve
as a guide, both at the level of moral discourse and at the policy level. Without
the natural law, without the moral "first principles" that help us maintain our
moral equilibrium, we become, in C.S. Lewis's words, "men without chests"
who, wittingly or unwittingly, facilitate the degradation of all that is humane.
As part of the Creator's revelation of moral reality, the natural law witnesses
to the fact that we have no "original and rightful jurisdiction" over the gift of
life. We possess no moral claim regarding human life as such, regardless of
whether these claims relate to beginning-of-life, life-enhancement, or end-of-
life matters. Thus, for example, natural-law thinking inhibits our efforts to
develop or justify partial or "subhuman" beings, in the end mutating the species
at the expense of some and for the convenience of others. Similarly, it inhibits
our attempts at therapeutic manipulation of life in its existing form for
Promethean purposes. Finally, it inhibits us from determining the "quality" of
existing life, as well as the timing and means by which we "terminate" life,
since life is to be understood as an endowment. In the end, what in Plato and
Jesus corresponds to the Golden Rule, what expresses itself in the contours of
the Ten Commandments, what St. Paul described as the "law written on the
heart," what this nation's fathers called "self-evident truths" based on "nature
and nature's God," what C.S. Lewis called the Tao, or what we call the natural
law serves as a reminder of moral reality. In the words of one public
philosopher, it witnesses to what we can't not know.
On the important ethical questions of the day, we are rudderless, lost at sea,
as it were, without a compass. Seduced by the enchantments of technological
progress, we are deaf to the voices of common sense and right reason. To
extend the seafaring metaphor, we have recklessly thrown overboard our
[Vol. 2:607
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accumulated moral and cultural wisdom,3 at the heart of which lies the natural
law.
Here I would like to consider the relationship between law, morality and
human moral accountability, before which I shall note, briefly in passing,
specific reasons for the neglect of natural-law thinking in Protestant thought
over the last sixty years. This will necessitate identifying several influential
Protestant thinkers, past and present, wittingly or unwittingly, who have helped
us to this place of relative impotence. And finally, I will simply identify several
crucial categories lying at the heart of contemporary ethical and bioethical
debates that bear some relation to the natural law.
II. THE NEGLECT OF THE NATURAL LAW IN PROTESTANT THINKING
But first, to the problem "within the camp." In the 1970s ethicist James
Gustafson classified Protestant opposition to natural law according to two
tendencies-historicism and existentialism. 4 Indeed, there is much in his
account that is commendable, for these two tendencies accurately explain much
of the rationalism and fideism that has pervaded Protestant thought. About the
same time, ethicist Paul Ramsey, though not a strong advocate for the natural
law a generation ago, cited a further contributing factor in its neglect: a
particular understanding of "christological justification and divine forgiveness"
that "strips politics of norms and principles distinguishing between right and
wrong.",
5
To begin, we should note that opposition to the natural law has been of two
types-revisionist and orthodox. My focus for the purposes of this conference
shall be the latter. Several names require mention, and this, due to the
constraints of time, only in passing. One is Karl Barth. In citing Barth I find
myself divided because of his important contribution to the "Confessing
Church" in Germany seventy years ago by way of his assistance in crafting the
Barmen Declaration that served to reiterate Christ's lordship against the
backdrop of National Socialist totalitarian confessions.6 With their theological
3. This is the imagery employed in LEON R. KASS, THE HUNGRY SOUL: EATING AND THE
PERFECTING OF OUR NATURE 6 (1994).
4. JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETIcs ch. 3 (1978).
5. Paul Ramsey, The Problem of Protestant Ethics, in WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN
CONSCIENCE (1961), reprinted in FROM CHRIST TO THE WORLD 212-14 (Wayne Boulton et al.,
eds., 1994). Strangely, despite acknowledging its necessity in the marketplace, Ramsey insists
that Christian ethics "transcends" the natural law, as suggested in his heading What the
Christian Does Without a Code: St. Paul's Answer. PAUL RAMSEY, BASIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS 84
(1954).
6. See KARL BARTH, THE CHURCH AND THE WAR, at v (1944).
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affirmation the participants at Barmen rejected the nazification of German
culture and affirmed that a Christian's ultimate allegiance could not be given to
an earthly Fiihrer. Not for nothing did he lose his teaching post at Basel a year
after the National Socialists came to power.
A major concern of Barth was to critique and guard against the
Enlightenment influences of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by which,
in his understanding, "nature" was at odds with revealed, logocentric,
Christocentric religion. The "idealized" and "humanized" understanding of
nature, as Barth viewed it, would have serious implications for German
thought. The increasing secularization of European culture, coupled with a
romantic view of "nature," for Barth blended easily into the core assumptions
of Enlightenment thinking and the new humanism of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, undermining the historic church's confession.7 Nature
represented for Barth that which man could dispose of, comprehend, shape, and
manipulate for his own purposes, while reason demonstrated man's superiority
over matter and man's ability to appropriate all things for himself. In this
sense, then, "natural" Christianity simply implies that which opposes the
supernatural character of grace and God's word.8 Thus, he believed, "natural
religion" operates as a sort of "Trojan horse" inside the walls of Christendom,
becoming a substitute for the "word of God." Barth, it should be remembered,
was not the only one struggling with social-political tyranny at the time.
But to be faithful to Christ's lordship is not to deny the challenge-or the
necessity-of communicating truth to the non-believer, whose worldview and
language are devoid of biblical and Christological understanding. How do
Christians communicate in a non-Christian world? How do we converse with
pagans? How does Christian faith clothe itself in a pluralistic society? Our point
of contact, as J. Budziszewski has well reminded us, is established by God
himself. That reference is general revelation, and the natural law is the moral
aspect of the penetrating arrow of general revelation. Without the natural law,
there is no common ground, no point of connection, no meaningful engagement
between Christians and non-believers.9
One must note in this context the heated debate between Barth and Emil
Brunner during the mid- 1940s that centered around natural law. At the heart of
this controversy lay the epistemological question of whether fallen humans
possess a natural knowledge of God. Brunner represented the position that
7. KARL BARTH, PROTESTANT THEOLOGY IN THE NNETEENTH CENTuRY: Irs BACKGROUND
AND HISTORY 41-45 (rev. ed. 2001).
8. Id. at 91.
9. None has argued this more succinctly than J. Budziszewski. See generally J.
BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CANNOT NOT KNow: A GUIDE (2003).
[Vol. 2:607
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 610 2007-2008
NATURAL LA WAND HUMAN DIGNITY
nature is normative insofar as "nature teaches" or "nature dictates." Implied
therein is that the will of God is embedded in creation and that it can be
recognized as such by all people. As Brunner saw it, the reality of sin does not
eradicate reason and conscience as the constituents of the imago Dei. Rather,
human beings by nature are inclined toward truth and have a capacity for
recognizing truth, the effects of human sinfulness notwithstanding.
Barth's response to Brunner was adamant. Knowledge that is naturally
intuited about God, he argued, is "a possibility in principle but not ... in
fact."10 The reason for this is that sin has obliterated any possibility of natural
theology, and therefore, any utility of "natural law." No second or
"independent" category of knowledge, for Barth, could exist in the aftermath of
the Fall. Reason simply cannot regain its original powers that it had before
humans sinned. The difference between Barth and Brunner is illustrative, for it
captures the fundamental disagreement between Roman Catholics and
Protestants over natural law to the present day. The critical question is whether
human reasoning and human apprehension of basic moral truth are universal,
present, and operative within fallen human beings by nature, and thus, whether
human beings can be held accountable for their actions. The historic Christian
tradition, without equivocation, answers affirmatively to both questions. Ever
since the Barth-Brunner controversy Protestant theology has been riddled with
suspicion and skepticism vis-A-vis natural law. In this regard, it would appear
that the influence of Barth has been dominant. With few exceptions, it is
difficult to identify any Protestant theologian or ethicist of note to this day who
has robustly championed the natural law.
Karl Barth, it should be remembered, is not the only Christian mind at this
time to have grappled with the dilemma of the totalitarian state. Other thinkers,
such as Heinrich Rommen, Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, and Eric Voegelin,
were among European dmigrds to the U.S in the 1930s and 40s who would
contribute to a renewal of natural-law thinking in the coming generation. What
all of these thinkers shared in common, in contrast to Barth, was the conviction
that a traditional metaphysics of natural law, consistent with Christian political
and moral thinking, might be advanced without capitulating to the modernist,
secularist, positivist, or fascist Zeitgeist.
A second name, perhaps of lesser significance to both Catholics and
Protestants, is that of Jacques Ellul. A supremely ambidextrous social critic,
Ellul is not particularly known for his theological writings, although several of
his works (e.g., The Subversion of Christianity and The Humiliation of the
10. EMIL BRUNNER AND KARL BARTH, NATURAL THEOLOGY 106 (P. Fraenkel trans., 1946).
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Word) are remarkably trenchant social critiques. However, his 1946
publication titled The Theological Foundations of Law was a "christocentric"
and "logocentric" broadside against the natural law for reasons not unlike those
of Barth.
Ellul is suspicious of any attempt on the part of theologians and natural
lawyers to find common ground between Christians and non-Christians. Such
an aim, he believes, is misguided, since it reveals a wrong-headed wish to
ignore or obscure "the tragic separation created by revelation and grace."' 1 To
emphasize "nature," as Ellul sees it, is to abandon grace and the supernatural,
collapsing any distinction between grace and what is merely human.'
2
Therefore, the natural law becomes a tool in the humanist project to bring about
reconciliation apart from grace and, hence, is "undeniably heretical."',
3
Ellul's bias against the natural law is rooted not merely in the fear of
rationalist autonomy. At the most elementary level, he insists that the
Scriptures "do not know of law in the proper sense of the term.' 14 And because
all justice and judgment in Scripture are understood by Ellul within the context
of redemption alone, we cannot therefore understand law without Christ at the
center; only at the Cross do we understand divine justice. A Christocentric
view ofjustice, Ellul argues, "radically destroys the ideas of objective law and
of eternal justice."' 5 It is theologically significant that Ellul reads the early
chapters of Genesis as he does. Through the Fall, man loses any and all
resemblance to Adam that he had prior: "we cannot admit the idea of the imago
Dei being preserved in man as the foundation of natural law."'16 And on this
point Ellul is emphatic: "In scripture, there is no possible knowledge of the
good apart from a living and personal relationship with Jesus Christ.' 7 Thus,
Ellul makes the critically important theological move of placing the natural law,
within salvation history, as a post-Fall necessity rather than as a part of a
theology of creation. He believes that Adam had knowledge of good and evil
only after the Fall; before the alienation Adam had no such awareness.18
Requiring a fair amount of commentary, at least in the American context, is
the enormously influential work of John Howard Yoder. Without question the
11. JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 10 (M. Wieser trans., 1969).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 45.
15. Id. at 46-47, 49, 61.
16. Id. at 61.
17. JACQUES ELLUL, To WILL AND To Do 16 (C.E. Hopkin trans., 1969).
18. Id. at 6, 14.
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most influential Anabaptist theologian of the last half-century, 19 Yoder has
exerted an inordinate influence on the ethical thinking of both Protestants and
Roman Catholics. Much of Yoder's great appeal is lodged in his commitment
to being "radical." Prominent in Yoder's work is a "radical" understanding of
Christian discipleship, his radical critique of "Constantinianism," and an
unrelenting radical critique of "the powers."
A baseline assumption that pervades all of Yoder's work is the belief that the
early church, in time, wrongly absorbed pagan philosophical influence, which
played a significant role in permitting it by Ambrose's and Augustine's day to
be "compromised" by the political realities. "Christian ethics," according to
Yoder, was developed in such a way as to justify Christian presence and
participation in Roman imperium; hence, the need for a sustained critique of
"Constantinianism" by the church of any era. The history of the church, for
Yoder, is one long, unrelenting road of apostasy and cultural idolatry, that is,
until "radical Reformation" of the sixteenth century.
The Politics of Jesus, which seeks to set forth an authentic Christian social
ethic rooted in a radical understanding of Jesus' teaching (and a particular
reading of the so-called "Sermon on the Mount") and Discipleship as Political
Responsibility are Yoder's most helpful tracts in this regard. Herein he laments
two dominant interpretations: the "Catholic," with its "Stoic" emphasis on
reason and natural law that "foreshortens" our vision of the Kingdom by its
focus on "the nature of things," and the "Augustinian-reformed," which was
"compromised" by the political powers. Christian ethics, as Yoder conceives it,
is located neither in human "nature" nor in rational notions of justice or the
common good. Rather, it subsists in our radical obedience to what Yoder
understands as Jesus' ethics of non-violent resistance to political and social
oppression.
Of significance for his understanding of natural-law reasoning, Yoder
believes that "standard ethical discernment" of our time has distracted us in our
ability to demonstrate an authentic Christian social ethics. Part of this
"distraction," Yoder insists, is that Roman Catholic theology keeps reminding
us that nature and grace do not stand in fundamental opposition.20 Like Karl
Barth, Yoder worries that a natural-law emphasis leads to national idolatry.2
19. I speak as one who grew up in the Mennonite tradition and thus appreciate from the
inside Yoder's influence.
20. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, FOR THE NATIONS: ESSAYS PuBLIc AND EvANGELIcAL (1997)
[hereinafter YODER, FOR THE NATIONS], where he develops this assumption.
21. Recall that Yoder studied under Barth at Basel. See JOHN HOwARD YODER, KARL
BARTH AND THE PROBLEM OF WAR (1970). In the preface he writes: "To Karl Barth, who taught
me to rethink my faith in the light of the Word of God." Id. at 7.
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Yoder, to be fair, is at his best when he is exposing the Christian community's
tendency toward cultural idolatry, for he is fluent in his critique of twentieth-
century idolatries and in his grasp of the character of prophetic ministry.22 And
it is here that he is also at his worst, to the extent that he is unwilling to submit
his notion of moral formation, Christian social ethics, and critique of the
powers to the collective wisdom of the historic Christian tradition. Given his
over-arching commitment to ideological pacifism, Yoder's rejection of the
natural law is best understood as a by-product, not a cause, of his pacifist ethics.
And with Barth, Yoder believes that the natural law is "an addition" to the
Word of God as divine revelation.23
In assorted writings, the Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas confesses
his debt to Yoderian Anabaptism in wishing to advance Yoder's vision of
"Christian social ethics." That one news magazine in 2001, rightly or wrongly,
described Hauerwas as the most influential theologian in America is some
indication of his influence in molding Protestant ethical thought. A prolific
writer and innovative thinker, Hauerwas has been explicit in his rejection of the
natural law, notably in The Peaceable Kingdom, Christian Existence Today,
and Truthfulness and Tragedy. Wishing to further promote the "radical critique
of Constantinianism" of Yoderian Anabaptism, Hauerwas argues that "the
alleged transparency of the natural law norms reflects more the consensus
within the church than the universality of the natural law itself." This
conviction is substantiated "by the fact that the power of natural law as a
systematic idea was developed in and for the Roman imperium and then for
'Christendom.'
24
The natural-law tradition, then, as interpreted by Hauerwas, rather than
offering an account of moral principles that are "the same for all, both as to
rectitude and as to knowledge" (Thomas Aquinas), a knowledge that all people
possess, rendering them "without excuse" (St. Paul), is a "culturally
assimilationist" attempt at Christian ethics that mirrors the Church's cultural
captivity. Given the manner in which the "abstractions" of "nature and grace"
have "distorted how ethics has been undertaken in the Catholic tradition,,
25
Hauerwas views natural-law thinking as a "primitive metaphysics" and the
22. While this is a prominent theme in all of Yoder's writings, see JOHN HOWARD YODER,
The Power Equation, the Place ofJesus, and the Politics of King, in YODER, FOR THE NATIONS,
supra note 20, at 125-47.
23. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, Discerning the Kingdom of God in the Struggles of the
World, YODER, FOR THE NATIONs, supra note 20, at 245.
24. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRIsTIAN ETHIcs 51
(1983).
25. Id. at 55-57.
[Vol. 2:607
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 614 2007-2008
NATURAL LA WAND HUMAN DIGNITY
product of the Constantianian era.26 The multifaceted insufficiency of natural-
law thinking is succinctly spelled out by Hauerwas in The Peaceable Kingdom;
its deficiencies are thought to include:
* its failure to offer a sufficient account of community,
* its failure to acknowledge that there is no such thing as a
universal morality and the fact that it "perverts" the nature of the
Christian moral life,
* its creation of a distorted moral psychology that ignores the
dispositions of the moral agent,
* its autonomy and thus inherent tendency to confuse nature and
grace,
* its ignoring of the narrative character of Christian ethics, and
" its inability to inhibit the inherent violence of this world,
tempting us to coerce those who disagree with us.
27
Some of these objections, the reader will recognize, issue out of Hauerwas's
pre-commitment to ideological pacifism. The use of force--any degree of
force-and reluctantly going to war are for him necessarily and thus always
"the compromises we make with sin," indeed a "cooperation with sin" and
therefore always unjust.28  But John Courtney Murray's basic distinction
between "violence" and "force," I think, is helpful in responsibly addressing the
ideological error of Hauerwas's position: "Force is the measure of power
necessary and sufficient to uphold.., law and politics. What exceeds this
measure is violence, which destroys the order of both law and politics .... As
an instrument, force is morally neutral in itself."29
What is relevant in light of Hauerwas's objections to the natural law,
however, is the fact that far from preparing society for violence, contra
Hauerwas, the natural law preserves social bonds, helping to guard basic
freedoms rather than threatening them. And not only is it the grammar of a
common moral discourse that Christians must utilize with unbelievers,3° it is a
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 63-64.
28. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, SHOULD WAR BE ELIMINATED? (1984), which is based upon
this assumption.
29. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS OF THE
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 274 (1960).
30. This problem illustrates the weakness of the Anabaptist and separatist commitment that
Hauerwas, like Yoder, so stridently wishes to defend. By their account, the Church is to
constitute a prophetic community that constantly reminds culture of its misplaced faith in power
and violence. While there is an element of truth in this conviction, it fails at several levels-
among these: being overly simplistic regarding issues ofjustice, reserving justice solely for the
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part of divine revelation-not antithetical to a genuinely "Christian" social
ethics that Hauerwas is so concerned to defend-by which the public
square not only can but must be preserved.
Not only. Aristotle, but Christian moral thinkers from Aquinas to Jacques
Maritain and C.S. Lewis to John Paul II have argued for the application of
natural-law thinking in the realm of public discourse. All were cognizant of the
need to argue for moral first principles on the basis of human nature. To do
such in a pluralistic environment is not to capitulate to the culture, as Hauerwas
would suggest. Mainstream Christian moral thinkers of prior generations were
united in their affirmation of the "permanent things." One of the most
important lessons we can learn from them is that, in contrast to the Yoderian-
Hauerwasian approach to ethics, they understood that public morality must rest
upon public principles-principles that are rooted in the fabric of creation. For
this reason, they championed the time-honored idea of the natural law--out of
the conviction that basic moral principles, assumed by and standing in
agreement with biblical revelation, are accessible to all people by virtue of God-
given reason. In this light we gain new appreciation for the ever-relevant
argument of C.S. Lewis regarding the Tao in both Mere Christianity and The
Abolition of Man. Not only does the natural law not contravene the ethics of
Jesus, as an ethical standard it
cannot be escaped ...; it is the source from which all moral
judgments spring. Its cardinal virtues--"justice, honesty, good
faith, magnanimity, beneficence, mercy-are known to be true
independently of experience.. . [and] these basic precepts form a
moral common ground that undergirds all civilized societies.3'
Lewis, of course, was well aware that Christians-and Protestants in
particular-object to the natural law precisely because they are convinced that
it detracts from Christianity. But Lewis rejected this view. Far from
contradicting Christian social ethics, the natural law is in truth presupposed by
it. And Lewis himself leaves little room for misunderstanding, offering the
reader further rationale in Christian Reflections:
The idea that Christianity brought an entirely new ethical code into
the world is a grave error. If it had done so, then we should have to
eschaton rather than in present reality as well, calling believers away from the marketplace and
social institutions that desperately need the leaven of Christian influence, being overly
pessimistic about political power. Sadly and additionally, this mindset, because it wishes to don
a "prophetic" mantle, tends to spawn a self-righteous attitude.
31. John G. West, Jr., Politics in the Shadowlands: C.S. Lewis on Earthly Government,
POL'Y REv. 69-70 (1994).
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conclude that all who first preached it wholly misunderstood their
own message: for all of them, its Founder, His precursor, His
apostles, came demanding repentance and offering forgiveness, a
demand and an offer both meaningless except on the assumption of
a moral law already known and already broken.32
Lewis continues, "it is no more possible to invent a new ethics than to place a
new sun in the sky. Some precept from traditional morality always has to be
presumed. We never start from a tabula rasa: if we did, we should end,
ethically speaking, with a tabula rasa."33 There is, I think, wisdom in what
Lewis is saying-wisdom that counters the autonomy and arrogance of much
contemporary Protestant ethics.
Voices as diverse as ethicist Gilbert Meilaender, Lutheran theologian Carl
Braaten and Roman Catholic social critics George Weigel and David Schindler
join Vigen Guroian in the conviction that the Yoder-Hauerwasian approach to
Christian ethics, in its practice, wittingly or unwittingly discourages responsible
Christian participation in society.34 While Yoder has been quite sensitive to the
criticism from the outside that his radical Anabaptist separatism does not
engender social withdrawal, he counters that, properly understood, it is a
principled posture that voluntarily embraces "faithful non-participation. 35
However forceful Yoder's protest, it is a fact that his "radical critique of
Constantinianism" and his "radical Anabaptism," in their practice, have tended
to engender social withdrawal.36 Braaten laments, with some justification, I
think, the fact that highly visible Christian ethicists, in their rejection of the
notion of natural law, are unable, despite their considerable influence, to equip
the Christian community effectively in terms of its cultural mandate. 37 I am
32. C.S. Lewis, On Ethics, in CHRISTIAN REFLECTIONS 46 (W. Hooper ed., 1967).
33. Id. at 53.
34. GILBERT MEILAENDER, FAITH AND FAITHFULNESS: BASIC THEMES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS
19-22 (1991); DAvID L. SCHINDLER, HEART OF THE WORLD, CENTER OF THE CHURCH: COMMUNIO,
ECCLESIOLOGY, LIBERALISM, AND LIBERATION (1996); GEORGE WEIGEL, CATHOLICISM AND THE
RENEWAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 196-200 (1989); Carl E. Braaten, Protestants andNatural
Law, FIRST THINGS 20-26 (Jan. 1992).
35. See JOHN HOwARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972), where this is a veritable
subtheme.
36. I offer this assessment as one who grew up in the Anabaptist-and specifically,
Mennonite-context, and thus understand it from the inside. There is a reason why Anabaptists
are not found in numerous vocational settings, such as law enforcement, the military, security,
economics, policy analysis, the social sciences, research, legal theory and law practice,
government and civil service. It is for this very reason that Martin Luther published his tract
Whether Soldiers Too, Can Be Saved.
37. Carl E. Braaten, Protestants and Natural Law, 19 FIRST THINGS 20-26 (Jan. 1992).
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inclined, at some level, to agree.
III. THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALITY
It scarcely needs pointing out that ours is a day in which the relationship
between law and morality is hotly contested, when it is not outright denied.
Exacerbating this state of affairs is religious thinking on the subject. One of the
abiding weaknesses of Protestant theology is not only its false dichotomy
between grace and nature but also its inattention to-when not outright
dismissal of-the role of law and law's place in a theology of creation. Critical
questions are at stake. Can "law," generically understood, represent moral
objectivity? Are there objective moral standards by which to interpret law? Is
law discovered or is it created? Does it originate in human ingenuity? In
human "legality"? Our questioning is not concerned with how cultural values
that are negotiable-social, ethnic or cultural diversity, for example-might be
determined. In this realm there is plenty of elasticity and room for
disagreement. The greater question is whether law might serve as a mirror of
the eternal, whether justice is conceived as fluid or non-fluid, and whether in
the marketplace we might contend, over against the regnant moral nihilism of
our day, for the "permanent things."
If I am correct in my conviction that the greatest ethical challenges to life in
Western culture-from the embryonic stage to genetic enhancement to
euthanasia-lie ahead of us, then Christians of all varieties will need not only to
rethink their own position regarding a comprehensive cultural strategy of "life"
but also to contend for that conviction-comprehensively-in terms of broader
social and public policy. Someone's basic assumptions about "life," someone's
morality, after all, will be imposed on the culture through the social, legal and
political apparatus.38
If law and morality are separated, as they are in modem Protestant thought
and in secular society as a whole, then we operate at a severe disadvantage,
ethically cut off at the knees. For without law, "laws" become arbitrary. And
without law, there is no foundation for ethics, for demarcating human behavior.
As an ethical measure, law has both apositive and negative capacity; that is, it
can both induce and restrain. As such, it is both pedagogical or tutorial as well
as restrictive. 39 Because law has an ethical end or telos, as Aquinas argued,
38. See Robert P. George, Bioethics and Public Policy, in ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH
OF ORTHODOXIES, 273-302 (2001), which provides an instructive tale and chronicles dissent and
faithfulness among Roman Catholics in the U.S. over the last three decades as it applies to "pro-
life" issues.
39. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 3 (1994). In this regard, he expresses half
of the truth-an exceedingly important part of the truth-when he writes:
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because it is the object of human longings, 40 it is not merely "external." Recall
the words of the Psalmist in this regard:
*"Blessed is the man.., whose delight is in the law of the Lord ....
*"Your statutes are my delight ....
" "I delight in your commands because I love them."
43
. "I delight in your law.
'
"
4
For this reason, St. Paul, that champion of grace, can say that the law is "holy,
righteous and good";45 already, we must remember, he had conceded that this
goodness and rightness are intuited through the natural law written on the
heart.46 And for this reason the Catholic Catechism states, "The moral law is
the work of divine Wisdom." As "God's pedagogy," the moral law "prescribes
for man the ways, the rules of conduct that lead to the promised beatitude,"
while at the same time it "proscribes the ways of evil which turn him away from
God ....
Thus, the neglect and rejection of law are not only a product of deeply
secularizing tendencies in the culture; they are also the product of theologically
deficient thinking. And sadly, not merely revisionist parts of the church but
also the more orthodox, who have stressed grace and Christocentrism, have
contributed to a negation of the natural law. Regardless of its source, in those
human domains wherein law is denied, darkness and disorder become the
"law." Properly understood, law mirrors abiding moral truths, pointing to a
higher authority in the universe. In the words of Aquinas, the natural law is
nothing else but a participation in the eternal law by rational creatures.48 The
Laws cannot make men moral. Only men can do that; and they can do it only by
freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right reason. Laws can
command outward conformity to moral rules, but cannot compel the internal acts
of reason and will make an act of external conformity to the requirements of
morality a moral act.
Id.
40. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 1-11, q. 92 (Benziger Bros. ed., 1947)
(1274), available at http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP.html.
41. Psalms 1:2.
42. Psalms 119:24.
43. Psalms 119:47.
44. Psalms 119:70.
45. Romans 7:12.
46. Romans 2:14-15.
47. Catechism of the Catholic Church § 1950, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/
catechism/ccc toc.htm [hereinafter CCC].
48. AQUINAS, supra note 40, at pt. I-I, q. 91.
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Ten Commandments as promulgated at Sinai "were but the concrete and
practical form" of ethical first things that existed from the beginning. 49 Thus,
natural law and divine law provide internal and external witness to all people as
to what is morally right. Human laws are morally legitimate only to the extent
that they are grounded in natural moral law. Not all of the natural law can
become legislation, just as kindness or generosity cannot he prescribed by law.
But no human law may oppose the natural law without becoming a perversion
of law.50
It is reasonable to argue that most people (and most societies) hold to the
belief, however vague, that morality-pursuing the good or acceptable and
avoiding evil or the unacceptable-is a higher norm than what we, in the
Western cultural context, call "positive law." Thereby society shows a basic
concern for the health of the wider community.51 The presumption among this
nation's founders and framers of the "Laws of Nature" and of "Nature's God,"
regardless of how utterly quaint it may strike contemporary culture, simply
mirrors a broader consensus that has withstood the test of time. And for this
reason John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor, speaks of this consensus as
"participated theonomy," by which he refers to the natural law with its
metaphysical realities, not a theocracy in the narrower sense.52 Moreover, this
consensus, and only this consensus, furnished the basis with which to oppose
slavery and address egregious human rights violations, and to argue for human
rights that are "inalienable." Therefore, we are justified in calling the natural
law a "first principle." Because of the reality of this "first principle,"
individuals and societies are inclined to establish a hierarchy of goods and
values. Thus, public morality will be a reflection, for better or worse, of this
assumed moral hierarchy.53 Public policy, therefore, will be designed to accord
with and mirror these priorities-whether that legislation affects business,
commerce, employment, science and technology, family, the arts, or education.
In the end, law retains its ethical function in a moral universe. Negatively, it
has a restraining function (that humans might avoid evil), and positively, it has
49. JOHN MURRAY, PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT: ASPECTS OF BIBLICAL ETMCs 7 (1991).
50. AQUINAS, supra note 40, at pt. I-II, q. 95.
51. Id.
52. John Paul's understanding of a "participated theonomy" finds parallels in the "sphere
sovereignty" of Dutch Reformed political thought, notably that of Abraham Kuyper. See
ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (Eerdmans 1998) (1898).
53. Steven A. Long has well asserted that, "If Kant, Nietzsche, and Foucault share nothing
else, they share this common negation of metaphysical objectivity and of the doctrine that
human nature is knowably ordered to ends which have the nature of the good, leading to the
finis ultimis, the final end and supreme good." Steven A. Long, Reproductive Technologies and
the Natural Law, NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 226 (Summer 2002).
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a pedagogical function, serving as a tutor or guide in our moral perfection.
Thus, it should not surprise us that every generation, writes legal scholar
Russell Hittinger, finds a new reason for the study of the natural law.54 For a
generation past, in the mid-twentieth century, totalitarianism provided the
occasion. Hittinger cites German legal scholar and 6migr6 to the U.S. Heinrich
Rommen in this regard to make his point: "When one of the relativist theories is
made the basis for a totalitarian stated, man is stirred to free himself from the
pessimistic resignation that characterizes these relativist theories and to return
to his principles. 55 Hittinger sees parallels between the "pessimistic
resignation" of Rommen's day, with its "tired agnosticism" regarding the moral
bases and ends of law that had left the German legal profession intellectually
defenseless in the face of changes in German society in the 1930s. Like
Rommen, Hittinger calls us to rediscover the "moral predicates" of law and
politics, without which democratic institutions cannot long survive. When
these "moral predicates," or "first things," are challenged, obscured or denied,
it becomes once again necessary to assert not only their reality but their place in
the culture.56
IV. HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
While much indeed could be said regarding the culture's unwillingness to be
held morally accountable for its actions, what is notable is the increasing and
sophisticated justification for the view that biology is destiny. Social critics and
behavioral theorists tell us that we have entered the "biological century," while
philosopher-activists such as Edward 0. Wilson, 57 Michael Ruse,58 and Richard
54. Russell Hittinger, Introduction to HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN
LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY, at xii (T.R. Hanky trans., 1998) (1936).
55. HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 48 (1945), cited in Hittinger,
supra note 54, at xii. Rommen joined a number of Europeans dmigr~s who came to the States
and who, taking up teaching posts at American universities, made their mark on political and
legal thought. These individuals include Leo Strauss, Eric Voegclin, Jacques Maritain and Yves
Simon.
56. See RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A
POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003), which is lucidly written and argues for the place of the natural
law in the culture.
57. See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975); EDWARD 0.
WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998); EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN
NATURE (1978); and EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSrrY OF LIFE (1976).
58. See, e.g., MICHAEL RUSE, DARWIN AND DESIGN: DOES EvOLUTON HAVE A PURPOSE?
(2003); MICHAEL RUSE, THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION (1999); MICHAEL RUSE, CAN A DARWINIAN
BE A CHRISTIAN? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION (2001); and MICHAEL
RUSE, THE EVOLUTION WARS (2000).
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Dawkins,59 seek to move us away from moral agency. And this is only the tip
of the iceberg. 60 Given recent advances in genetic research, the gene has
become a cultural icon. We have grown accustomed to hearing about pleasure-
seeking genes, violent genes, gay genes, depression genes, couch-potato genes
and celebrity genes--everything but the kitchen-sink gene.
61
Evolutionary accounts of ethics, popularized in our day, proceed on the
belief that morality originates with biology. So, for example, Michael Ruse can
confidently declare, "The question is not whether biology-specifically, our
evolution-is connected with ethics, but how." 62 Sociobiologist Edward 0.
Wilson is equally assertive that "causal explanations of the brain activity and
evolution . . . already cover most facts known about behavior we term
'moral."' 63 If this is not enough certitude with which to convince us, Ruse and
Wilson combine in an essay published in the journal Philosophy to contend that
"the time has come to turn moral philosophy into an applied science because..
one hundred years without Darwin are enough." 64 Intimidating stuff.
For evolutionists such as Ruse and Wilson, morality is "universal" only to
the extent that it has a biological, genetic basis and mirrors our interface with
the environment. That is to say, the moral "sense" within the human species is
an evolutionary adaptation that is part of the natural selection process. Human
morality, these evolutionists insist, is "merely an adaptation.., to further our
reproductive ends., 65 It is a human convention that is in place for survival, to
which we are genetically predisposed.66
While the likes of Wilson, Ruse and Dawkins may be daunting to the rest of
59. One thinks, for example, of Dawkins' 1989 volume, The Selfish Gene, published by
Oxford University Press. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989).
60. See, e.g., JANE MAIENSCHEN &MICHAEL RUSE, EDS., BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF
ETHICS (1999); MATTHEW H. NrrEcKi & DORIS V. NrrEcKI, EVOLUTIONARY ETHIcs (1993);
HOLMES ROLSTON, III, GENES, GENESIS, AND GOD: VALUES AND THEIR ORIGINS IN NATURAL AND
HuMAN HISTORY (1999); HOLMES ROLSTON, III, BIOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE ORIGINS OF LIFE
(1995); see also Elliott Sober, Evolution and Ethics, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Craig ed., 2000).
61. See the almost hilarious cultural critique of Jeffrey Reid, The DNA-ing of America,
UTNE READER 26 (Sept.-Oct. 1995).
62. Michael Ruse, Evolutionary Ethics: A Defense, in BIOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE ORIGINS
OF LIFE 93 (Holmes Rolston, III, ed., 1995).
63. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 278 (1998).
64. Michael Ruse & Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as an Applied Science, PHIL.
173-92 (April 1986).
65. Id. at 51.
66. For a thoughtful evaluation of the evolutionary account of ethics, see Miguel Endara,
Deficiencies in the 'Selfish Genes' View of Ethics: A Critique of the Evolutionary Account,
NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 517-30 (Autumn 2003).
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us who are still working out our natural selection, a rather conspicuous fault-
line emerges in their work. A primary philosophical vulnerability among
secular naturalists, of which they are certainly representative, is their disavowal
or denial of free will. This weakness, both at the theoretical and practical level,
will need some probing, especially given its implications for ethics, moral
agency and self-responsibility.
In the ongoing debate over nature versus nurture, nature currently has the
upper hand. Biology is destiny, or at least the scientific pendulum has been
swinging in that direction. The received wisdom of the behavioral sciences
regarding the relationship between genetics and environment in explaining
human behavior has changed dramatically in the last two decades.67 In 1992,
significantly, the American Psychological Association identified genetics as one
of several themes best representing the present and future of psychology. 68 And
given recent advances in genetic research, the gene is becoming-when it has
not already become-a cultural icon. This development can he measured not
only by the gene's iconic status in scientific and medical journals but also in
popular culture and political discourse.
Not for nothing has one social critic in recent years argued against what he
calls "biopolitics," by which he seeks to warn us of the ambiguous relationship
between science and political power in the democratic context.69 And while
doing criminal justice research in Washington during the early 1990s I began to
observe the emergence of biological explanations for crime. "Biopolitics" so
understood is, I think, a legitimate concern.
Increasingly, diverse social commentators maintain that we stand on the
threshold of the "biological century." While physics has dominated the century
just past, advances in other laboratories suggest a noteworthy shift. Writes
Gregory Benford, a professor of physics at the University of California, Irvine:
Just as the 1890s hummed with physical gadgetry, our decade [and
beyond] bristles with striking biological inventions. Conceptual
shifts will surely follow. Beyond 2000, the principal social, moral,
and economic issues will probably spring from biology's metaphors
and approach and from its cornucopia of technology. Bio-thinking
67. See, e.g., DOROTHY NELKIN AND MARY S. LINDEE, THE DNA MYsTIQuE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON (1995); EvELYN Fox KELLER, REFIGURING LIFE: METAPHORS OF TWENTIETH
CENTURY BIOLOGY (1995).
68. See NATuRE, NURTURE, AND PSYCHOLOGY (Robert Plomin et al., eds., 1993).
69. MICHEL SCHOOYANS, THE MATRIX OF LIFE-HUMAN DOMINATION (1996), an English
translation of the French title Maitrise de la vie-domination des hommes.
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will inform our world and shape our vision of ourselves. 70
Six years into the "biological century," Benford's prophecy certainly appears
true. But what shall we make of the vaunted biotechnological advances as we
head into the twenty-first century? What place shall these advances be
accorded? And from an ethical standpoint, what do they portend?
With exhilarating speed, ongoing progress in the biomedical and
biotechnological fields confronts contemporary society with inherently
perplexing ethical dilemmas--dilemmas that will need to be addressed against
a prevailing backdrop of scientific materialism and moral skepticism. In the
view of the authors of The DNA Mystique, the gene has become an explanation
for human behavior that is too readily appropriated, too seldom criticized, and
too frequently misused in the service of socially destructive ends.7' In the end,
the gene is not merely a cultural metaphor; it holds sway over scientific
assumptions and theory, both of which trickle down to drive common culture.
The victim in all of this, of course, is free will-moral agency. The
relationship between biology and free will, fully apart from recent advances in
science, has long occupied scientists and philosophers. Are human beings
capable of moral reason and free choice and thus responsible for their actions?
Is there a dimension of human existence that transcends the gene and biology,
thereby allowing humans to define themselves morally and spiritually? Is
human behavior determined by one's genetic make-up?
In light of the more recent progress in genetics, notably the mapping of the
human genome, the stakes are raised significantly regarding the question of
whether humans are fully "accountable" for their behavior. While identifying
the genetic basis for an ever-growing number of diseases has been a particular
focus of medical genetic research, of equal interest among scientists has been
the attempt to explain the interplay between genes and behavior. Are human
beings truly capable of self-determination, whatever their gene-based
psychological and physiological dispositions? Or are humans mere robots
programmed by their genes and thus not to be held morally responsible for their
actions? Writing in Ethics and Medics, Ren6e Mirkes summarizes the critical
issues that stand before us with the new genetic twist to the question of moral
self-responsibility:
According to chemical reductionism central to biological
determinism, the causal laws of the tightly structured nexus of
human biology-a nexus that is becoming ever more refined
70. Gregory Benford, Biology 2001: Understanding Culture, Technology, and Politics in
'The Biological Century', REASON 23 (November 1995).
71. See generally NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 67.
[Vol. 2:607
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 624 2007-2008
NATURAL LA WAND HUMAN DIGNITY
through the advances of human genetics-dictate human behavior.
It is illogical within this view of human behavior to require personal
responsibility for the moral quality of one's actions; moral
accountability makes sense only if actions proceed from a free
agency.
72
The biological metaphor, then, which is no mere metaphor, would appear to
have the potential of allowing us to re-conceive the entire realm of human
behavior. What indeed does biology tell us regarding human activity? And,
perhaps more importantly, what does it not tell us?
For much of the previous century, human behavior has been explained by its
relationship to humans' environment. And broadly speaking, social science-
from social psychology to cultural anthropology to criminology-remains in
thrall to the notion that one's identity and behavior are the products of one's
environment.73 Yet curiously parallel to the "nurture" model has been the
accumulation of biogenetic evidence suggesting that human behavior is less
socially constructed or manipulated than behavioral theorists have heretofore
believed. Molecular biologists, through their mapping, classification and
analysis of the human genome, posit an entirely different model for
understanding human actions.74
Every moral theory proceeds on the basis of a particular view of human
nature. And nowhere are the implications for competing anthropologies more
critical than in the realm of bioethics. One's anthropology will determine our
ethical responses to questions of life's origin, life's dignity, human suffering
and death. If human beings bear the divine image, and if there exists a
divinely-ordered moral structure to the universe (what we call the natural law),
then it is incumbent upon "pro-life" advocates creatively and faithfully to work
72. Rene Mirkes, Programmed by Our Genes?, 16 ETHICS AND MEDICS 1 (1991).
73. For a critique, see Francis Fukuyama, Is It All in the Genes?, COMMENT. 30-35 (Sept.
1997).
74. Roger Masters, director of an annual seminar at Dartmouth College on biological
perspectives in the social sciences, has pointed out that most university departments of social
science have relatively few members who stay abreast of research in the life sciences. That gap
prompted the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research and Dartmouth's Nelson
Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences to begin co-sponsoring annual seminars for the
purpose of bringing together the two disciplines. For examples of the emerging conversations
that began to surface in the mid 1990s between social scientists and evolutionary biologists, see
Kim A. McDonald, Biology and Behavior, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. A19-21 (Sept. 1994).
These conversations continue and are more spirited than ever. One need only peruse sources as
diverse as the Chronicle of Higher Education, the American Journal of Bioethics, as well as
numerous scientific and philosophical periodical and quarterlies to observe the extent to which
these debates proceed unabated.
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toward the shaping of a moral consensus in culture. Thus, it will be necessary
on an ongoing basis to remind ourselves of several critical categories that will
find themselves at the very heart of pressing bioethical debates in the days
ahead.
V. CRITICAL CONCERNS
7 5
A. Rethinking Personhood: Sanctity or Quality?
For the average layperson who does not stay abreast of developments in
bioethics or the academy, statements like the following almost seem pulled
from science fiction.
We all know lots of people; we all know lots of persons. Normally
we use the term "persons" as a synonym for "human beings," people
like us. However, we are also familiar with the idea that there are
nonhuman persons, and humans whom are not, or may not be[,]
persons or full persons .... Human nonpersons or humans who are
not fully fledged person may include zygotes and embryos, or
individuals who are "brain-dead," anencephalic infants, or
individuals in a persistent vegetative state.76
If nonhumans turn out to possess significantly more advanced
capacities than customarily envisioned, their moral standing would
be upgraded to a more human level. However, this possibility
remains speculative and may be less important than the thesis that
because many humans lack properties of personhood or are less than
full persons, they are thereby rendered equal or inferior in moral
standing to some nonhumans. If this conclusion is defensible, we
will need to rethink our traditional view that these unlucky humans
cannot he treated in the ways we treat relevantly similar nonhumans.
For example, they might he aggressively used as human research
subjects and sources of organs.77
75. Parts of this section are developed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7 of my Retrieving
the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things. J. DARYLCHARLES, RTREViNG THENAuRAL
LAW: A RETURN TO MORAL FIRST THNGS (2008).
76. John Harris, The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life, 9 KENNEDY INST. OF
ETmcs J. 293 (1999).
77. Tom L. Beauchamp, The Failure of Theories of Personhood, 9 KENNEDY INST. OF
ETucs J. 320 (1999).
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Taken in itself... membership of the human species is not morally
relevant .... [W]hatever criteria [for personhood] we choose...
we will have to admit that they [sic] do not follow precisely the
boundary of our own species .... There will surely be some
nonhuman animals whose lives, by any standard, are more valuable
than the lives of some humans. A chimpanzee, a dog, or pig, for
instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater
capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely
retarded infant or someone in a state of advanced senility.78
Nonhuman persons. Unlucky humans. Nonhuman animals with greater worth
than some humans. What does it mean to be a "person"? To be a human
being"? Correlatively, what does it mean to be a "nonhuman person"? What
are "humans who are not.., persons or full persons"? More importantly, who
decides? By what criteria? And what are the implications of these distinctions
for human civilization, civil society and individual lives?
Related questions press upon us. What does it mean to have "moral
standing"? What indeed is "moral standing"? Who receives it? By what
measure and by what criteria is it conveyed? What are basic moral intuitions?
Are all people endowed with these basic intuitions, with a basic moral sense?
Does a consensus about "moral standing" and about being "human" change
with time and/or social location? Is "moral standing" fluid, different today than
it was decades ago? Centuries ago? Does it vary with different cultures,
societies and people-groups?
Such are by no means academic questions, even when celebrated academics
are weighing in on these matters in rather breathtaking ways. Rather, they lie at
the heart of civilized culture and are foundational in nature. And they confront
us anew as we navigate the entrance to the twenty-first century. Without
question, the last three decades have been witness to the break-up of any ethical
consensus that heretofore may have existed in Western societies. Nowhere has
this dissipation been more clearly on display than in the realm of bioethics. If
human life possesses nothing transcendent, nothing sacred, then it can only be
78. Peter Singer, Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement, in IN DEFENCE OF
ANIMALS 4, 19 (1985). Elsewhere, in Practical Ethics, Singer writes:
Now it must he admitted that these arguments [in favor of abortion and
infanticide] apply to the newborn animals whose rationality, self-consciousness,
awareness, capacity to feel (sentience), and so on, exceed that of a human being a
week, a month, or even a year old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life
as a person, it appears that the newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig,
a dog, or a chimpanzee.
PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETics 118 (1981).
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measured in terms of its social utility, its usefulness to others, its qualitative
benefits.
One moral philosopher asks us to engage in a thought experiment that
highlights the distinction between sanctity and quality of life. We are asked to
imagine that we invented a mighty Convenience Machine that would make our
lives more enjoyable and pleasurable. The down side of this invention is that
using the Machine would cost us about 50,000 lives each year. Would we use
the Machine? Should we allow it to be sold on the market?79 Despite our
culture's reticence to engage in moral reasoning, people typically react to this
thought experiment by agreeing that we should not, since no amount of
pleasure or comfort equals the value of a single life. Life, even for non-theists,
seems to be "sacred."
And yet, due to the volatile mix of the culture's post-consensus thinking
about ethics and the dazzling and sophisticated scientific technology before us,
the matter of sanctity becomes critically urgent. While life's sacredness is, to
be sure, a Judeo-Christian idea, it is more. There is a basic, or "natural," urge
to treat life as sacred, so much so that we might call it a universal self-evident.
"proto-religious ''s moral intuition. It should not, therefore, be all that
surprising that most religions espouse some version of the sanctity of life. Life,
thus, for most people is viewed as an endowment-an emphasis, of course, that
is pronounced in Christianity. Even as a bent, corroded coin bears the king's or
emperor's image, even the most distorted human being who is degraded by sin
bears the stamp, the imprint, of the Creator.8'
For Thomas Aquinas, dignity 2 is what distinguishes human beings through
the act of creation, an act that bestows on them a status that is unique within all
of the cosmos. 83 In the words of Paul Ramsey, man is "a sacredness in human
biological processes no less than he is a sacredness in the human social or
79. Louis POJMAN, LIFE AND DEATH: GRAPPLING WITH THE MORAL DILEMMAS OF OUR TIME
(1992).
80. This term is used by Pojman in chapter 2 of Life and Death. Id.
81. In Life andDeath (esp. chapter 2) Poj man develops the implications of sacredness quite
helpfully. Id.
82. Perhaps we should qualify the word "dignity," since there are several ways in which
humans use this term. By "dignity" we do not signify how one feels, such as when one's "sense
of dignity" (i.e., one's sense of self-worth or self-esteem) is threatened. Nor is dignity a
property or quality that we know through intuition. It is rather a possession, an endowment, an
essence that merits respect and consideration from other persons. Comparatively, it can be
appreciated by the fact that is distinguishes us from animals, since we are by nature rational,
moral agents. Most importantly, it follows that dignity cannot be lost or diminished because of
the reasons just stated.
83. See AQUINAS, supra note 40, at p. I-II, q. 29.
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political order .... His life is entirely an ordination, a loan, and a stewardship.
." Ours is what Ramsey calls "an alien dignity," i.e., an evaluation that is
conferred upon us.84 Not for nothing did Bernard Lonergan make the
observation that when nonhuman animals run out of biological opportunities
and activities- e.g., seeking food and shelter, mating and reproducing, playing,
avoiding pain and predators-they fall asleep. When humans, however, run out
of biological activity, they ask questions. The nature of this questioning always
and again returns to what it means to be human. 5
Human life, then, is of infinite value, regardless of whether that person has a
matter of minutes or many years to live, and regardless of the
perceived social utility, status of health, or projected life expectancy.
Therefore, some kinds of life are not more worth living than others despite the
utilitarian drumbeat of our day. A moral consensus has been emerging, not
only in conferences like this but in responsible bioethical debates, that the
embryo is worthy of dignity-based on nature and grace, general and special
revelation that are granted by the Creator.
In historic Christian theology, the significance of the doctrine of the imago
Dei is that every human creature points toward a Creator. The image is a
reflection of its origin. It follows then that our full imaging of the Creator
expresses itself through our fundamental nature and not merely our
functionality or social utility. That is, we live as knowing, loving, reasoning,
serving beings, always mirroring the image of the Creator in our humanness,
whether in our birthing, in our dying, or in between. Furthermore, because the
image of God is an endowment, personhood is neither developmental nor
incremental; nor is it the product of performance.86 The true image of God in
us is never removed from the human creature. The human person is a body-
soul composite, with the soulish dimension continuing to exist beyond physical
death.87 Viewed differently, in the words of William May, God cannot
incarnate himself in a pig or cow or ape insofar as those creatures are incapable
of reflecting the divine image. God has, however, incarnated himself in a
human, mysteriously choosing as the eternal uncreated Logos to become one of
84. Paul Ramsey, The Morality ofAbortion, in MORAL PROBLEMS 12-13 (James E. Rachels
ed., 1971)
85. For a thoughtful commentary on this human tendency to question, see ROBERT J.
SPITZER, ROBIN A. BERNHOFT & CAMILLE E. DE BLASI, HEALING THE CuLTuRE: A COMMONSENSE
PHILOSOPHY OF HAPPINESS, FREEDOM AND THE LIFE IssuEs 43-47 (2000).
86. This is not to deny that an infant progresses through developmental stages, only that it
has the natural capacity to do so because of human nature.
87. For an unusually sensitive analysis of the implications of human personhood and
dignity for contemporary bioethical debates, see Patrick Lee, Personhood, Dignity, Suicide, and
Euthanasia, NAT'L CATH. BioEmics Q. 329-43 (Autumn 2001).
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An important implication for human beings' mirroring of the divine image is
that human moral action will transcend mere impulse and desire. It will
conform to what is true, what is good, what is virtuous, and what is in harmony
with our intrinsic nature, as Aquinas wishes to make clear. Intrinsic human
nature, issuing out of the imago Dei, allows human beings to flourish, for they
can distinguish between ultimate and less-than-ultimate ends. Human actions
are morally good when humans use their moral freedom in ways that
correspond with their created nature. Therefore, deep within the interior life
human beings discover a "law"--the natural moral law-that they themselves
do not create yet which they feel obliged to obey. The Ten Commandments
merely describe the broader contours of this law, which through faith and virtue
are obeyed from the heart.
At the core of Judeo-Christian moral tradition is the proscription against
taking innocent life89-a proscription that undergirds civilized society. The
reason for this is that life is inherently sacred. 90 The scope of this "innocence"
is spelled out in a remarkably prescient statement to a group of physicians
several generations removed:
As long as a man is not guilty, his life is untouchable, and therefore
any act directly tending to destroy it is illicit, whether such an act is
intended as an end in itself or only as a means to an end, whether it
is a question of life in the embryonic stage or in a stage of full
development or already in its final stages.9'
88. William F. May, The Sanctity of Human Life, in IN SEARCH OF ANATIONAL MORALITY:
A MANIFESTO FOR EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLICS 105 (William Bentley Ball ed., 1992). I am
rejecting a dualism that permeates Western thought and which separates the person from his or
her body. If the bodily does not in truth constitute part of personhood, as most of our culture
believes, then human existence becomes sub-human or sub-personal, and therefore, the
destruction of life is not perceived as an attack on the person. Accordingly, such lives-whether
unborn, handicapped, diseased or dying possess no inherent value because they cannot engage
in socially meaningful activities or capacities. For a fuller treatment of current debates over
contrasting conceptions of personhood, see J.P. MORELAND AND SCOTT B. RAE, BODY AND SOUL:
HuMAN NATURE AND THE CRISIS IN ETHICS (2000).
89. Genesis 9:5-6; Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; Matthew 5:21; Romans 13:9; James
2:11. As born out by Hebrew grammar, the sixth commandment is an absolute proscription not
against all killing but against the taking of innocent life. Excluded from the command are the
killing of animals, war that is justified, the execution of criminals, and killing in self-defense.
90. Genesis 1:26-27; 9:5-6.
91. Pope Pius XII, Address to the St. Luke Union of Italian Physicians (Nov. 12, 1944), 66
ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 375 (1974), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIt H: MORE POST-CONCILIAR
DOCUMENTS 452 (1982).
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The contours of sacred life are further reiterated by one Vatican II document,
with almost prophetic insight, "All offenses against life itself such as murder,
genocide, abortion, euthanasia, and willful self-destruct ion" are "criminal,"
since they "poison civilization," "debase" both perpetrators and victims, and
"militate against the honor of the Creator., 92
Affrmning objective moral truth-as witnessed to by the natural moral law-
yields the common moral judgment to protect and dignify human life, and
particularly, vulnerable human life. Given our commitment to the intrinsic
dignity of the human person, we are forbidden categorically from eliminating it.
There is a moral line that connects the human embryo, fetal destruction,
euthanasia, slavery, genocide, and totalitarian rule. If it is agreed that we never
take the life of an innocent human, at any developmental stage and regardless
of its functionality, then intentionally taking life at any point along the life-
spectrum for any reason will always be wrong. It is wrong not merely because
the Christian Church or the Bible teaches that it is wrong but because the moral
law, "written on the heart" of every human, witnesses to its wrongness.
B. Rethinking Suffering: From Elimination to Transformation
Few would deny that, perched on the cusp of the Third Millennium, our
culture faces enormous ethical and bioethical challenges. It should not, then,
come as a surprise that the very idea of personhood-and human nature-is
being challenged at the most rudimentary level. Tempestuous cultural currents,
joining gale-wind forces, foment a turbulence at sea, as it were, that threatens to
sink the good ship "Sanctity," forcing us to rethink basic notions of
compassion, justice, and the good. Ultimately, how we construe personhood
will dictate how we express neighbor-love and, at the most practical level, how
we will extend morally responsible health care to those in need.
The ethical challenges that mirror the stormy nature of our present cultural
life seem to have coagulated on three principal fronts: beginning-of-life issues,
life-enhancement issues, and end-of-life issues. How we as a society view
suffering plays a critical role in how we approach each of these three domains.
But it will foremost govern how we approach aging and dying.
Given the increasing openness to euthanasia in the western cultural context,
one properly asks what attitudes in the culture currently push us in the direction
of assisted suicide. It is fair to say that a common denominator unites many of
our contemporaries as they reflect on death and dying. That common
92. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes, at § 27, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/
histcouncils/iivaticancouncil/documents/vat-iicons 19651207_gaudium-et-spes~en.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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denominator is fear. As a society we fear prolonged disability, we fear
becoming a burden to our families, we fear economic burden, we fear being
trapped by sterile technology and not dying in peace, we fear losing control,
and most fundamentally, we fear pain and suffering. Because of the
pervasiveness of these fears, we can predict, along with Sidney Callahan,93 the
appearance of more campaigns and referenda to compel state legislatures to
approve physician-assisted death. This development is compounded by the fact
that respected secular ethicists and physicians defend the morality of
euthanasia.
In light of the fact that our attitudes toward death and aging are shaped by
our fundamental beliefs about personhood and- the meaning of life, the
challenge before us, it should be emphasized, is foremost one of moral
persuasion and not political protest. Sadly, the religious tradition of which I
am a part in recent decades has tended to opt for the latter, the short-term
strategy, rather than the former, the long-term strategy, wchich (truth be told) is
hard work. It is hard work because it requires (1) moral education and (2)
engaging culture in socially-relevant ways rather than merely shouting from the
sidelines. A significant element in the moral argument that we will need to
make against suicide, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia concerns the
ethics of suffering. This will be no easy task.
Suffering, in the eyes of contemporary culture, is meaningless and hence to
be avoided at all costs and by all means. For this reason, abortion and
euthanasia-and to a lesser extent, infanticide-receive substantial popular
support. Why? Because they are perceived as necessary to end present-or to
prevent future-suffering. Each measure, therefore, becomes a "compassionate
choice."94 As it relates to end-of-life issues, the reality of suffering is thought to
imbue a person with both a moral and legal "right" to die.95
93. Sidney Callahan, The Moral Case Against Euthanasia, HEALThi PROGRESS 38-39 (Feb.
1995).
94. This mindset is described with utmost clarity by N.C. Lund-Molfese in The Gift of
Suffering versus Euthanasia, and Salvifici Doloris: A Challenge to Catholic Social Scientists.
N.C. Lund-Molfese, The Gift of Suffering versus Euthanasia, Soc. JUST. REV. 170-73
(November-December 1999); N.C. Lund-Molfese, Salvifici Doloris: A Challenge to Catholic
Social Scientists, Soc. JUST. REv. 108-11 (July-Aug. 2000).
95. Thus, on October 27, 1997, Oregon became the first state to legalize physician-assisted
suicide. Initiated in 1994 as Measure 16 ("The Oregon Death with Dignity Act"), the initiative
was voted into law by a margin of 51% to 49%. Oregon Health Division's second annual
report, published in the New England Journal of Medicine, is noteworthy for what it does not
report. Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon Health Plan: Lessons for the Nation, 342 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 598 (2000). For example, according to the report, only 37% of the patients killing
themselves in 1999 received a psychiatric evaluation. For a helpful assessment of the report, see
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The argument that the Christian community will need to advance has both a
negative and positive component. Negatively, we must make a public case in
exposing euthanasia and physician-assisted death for what it is-an evil that
destroys both individual integrity and the common good in society, thereby
rending asunder the fabric of civil society. 96 We in the West must be convinced
of "the interconnectedness of [all spheres of] life and the limits of a cult of
privacy, autonomy, and private property. 9 7  Positively, we must make a
compelling case for the alternative-namely, caring for the aged and dying in a
way that preserves both individual integrity and the common good. An
important "plank" in that campaign is to re-educate society regarding the
"redemptive" side of suffering. 98 This task, it must be stressed, is both
K. Foley and H. Hendin, The Oregon Report: Don't Ask Don't Tell, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
37-42 (May-June 1999). What is exceedingly alarming in Oregon is that those who are
sanctioned by the state government to assess its operation are advocates of physician-assisted
death. What's more, the very same issue of NEJM contained results of a Dutch study showing
that 18% of the physician-assisted suicides in the Netherlands are botched. See J.H.
Groenewoud, et al., Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide in the Netherlands, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 551 (2000).
96. For a forceful, and timely, response to the social consequences of euthanasia, see
Always to Care, Never to Kill: A Declaration on Euthanasia, FIRST THINGS 45-47 (Feb. 1992).
97. Callahan, supra note 93, at 40. The interconnectedness of all life can be graphically
illustrated on two levels by one very tragic suicide. A decade ago the Navy-indeed, the whole
nation-was rocked by news that Admiral Jeremy ("Mike") Boorda, the U.S. Navy's Chief of
Naval Operations, had taken his life. Because of the social stigma attached to self-inflicted
death as a result of a shotgun wound to the head, most people in the media, shell-shocked, were
extremely reticent to use the "s" word. The press made no mention of the hellish nightmare and
life-long emotional scars that Boorda's suicide had inflicted upon a wife and four children.
What's more, no one dared conjecture the immensely demoralizing effect the suicide had on the
millions of our nation's servicemen, irrespective of rank. Was it now preferable for officers or
non-officers alike, following Boorda's lead, to take their own lives, given the demands
associated with serving national interests? Because of the impact of suicide on communal
bonds, Sidney Callahan writes:
Maintaining an absolute prohibition against actively taking a human life-self or
other, with or without consent, dying or not-is necessary to protect human
communal bonds. All human living, loving, declining, and dying is full of stress
that must be endured and overcome by communal support. What humans need
most is an unconditional commitment to steadfastly care for one another through
any illness or impairment until the end comes.
Id.
98. Although suicide is a personal response to the pressures of a life deemed not worth
living, its thought germinates in a social climate in which a collapse both of the intellect and of
faith has already taken place. For a cultural analysis of our own time, see J. Daryl Charles,
Suicidal Thought in a Culture of Death, in SUICIDE: A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 209-20 (T. J. Demy
& G. P. Stewart eds., 1997).
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conceptual and pragmatic; it will need confronting at both the theoretical and
existential level.
From the standpoint of technology and research, the elimination of suffering
is typically extolled as a primary goal in debates over genetics and end-of-life
issues. The drive to eliminate suffering, however, does not necessarily spring
from authentic compassion for people who are in pain or suffering. Let the
reader beware. Its motivation may issue out of a utopian desire to rid society of
its imperfections by means of technology. Not surprisingly, this unfettered
optimism in technological advancement inevitably carries with it a deep-seated
bias against traditional religion and moral codes. In a culture in which
scientific and biomedical technology flourishes, disconcerting questions will
need to be raised by someone. For example, is the desire to eliminate suffering
in some cases misguided? Is it possible to find any meaning in suffering?
What if the desire to eliminate suffering bleaches society of its "humanizing"
dimensions such as service of love, sacrifice, compassionate care-giving,
community, personal character growth and development, in the end rendering
these elements nonsensical and illusory to people?99
In his 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae ("The Gospel of Life") John Paul
challenged his audience to embody a culture of life in the face of what he called
a "culture of death." While Evangelium Vitae was primarily a philosophical
reflection on contemporary culture and an exhortation toward authentic
Christian witness, the theological groundwork for this encyclical was laid
eleven years earlier in a significant though relatively unknown apostolic letter
titled Salvifici Doloris, or, "The Christian Meaning of Human Suffering."100 In
this letter, John Paul examines the meaning of personal suffering as well as the
Christian responsibility to the suffering of others. Because there is much in this
letter that commends itself to all people of faith, a brief summary of its contents
follows. As a tool it should greatly encourage the wider Christian community
as we seek to embody a redemptive presence in the current cultural context.
Though much shorter than an encyclical, Salvifici Doloris is divided into
eight progressively-developing parts.' 0' John Paul's basic thesis is that
meaning can only he found in suffering as a result of revelation, and
specifically, the revelation of Christ's suffering on the Cross and redemption of
99. Such a grim scenario has been thoughtfully critiqued by D.A. du Toit. See D.A. du Toit,
Anthropology and Bioethics, 10 ETHICS & MED. 39 (1994).
100. Salvifici Doloris is literally rendered "redemptive suffering."
101. Between introduction and conclusion are found the following sections: The World of
Human Suffering, The Quest for an Answer to the Question of the Meaning of Suffering, Jesus
Christ: Suffering Conquered by Love, Sharers in the Suffering of Christ, The Gospel of
Suffering, and The Good Samaritan.
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humankind that ensued. This, however, does not simply remain a religious
ideal; it becomes incarnated in meaningful and relevant ways.
Suffering, observes John Paul, is "a universal theme that accompanies man
at every point on earth," and therefore, demands to be constantly
reconsidered.10 2 In fact, St. Paul's words to the Roman Christians, that "the
whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now,"'0 3 are a
poignant reminder of the universality of the problem, even when suffering
"seems to be particularly essential to the nature of man.'1°4 Suffering, then, is
"almost inseparable from man's earthly existence.'05 Early on in the letter,
John Paul reminds his audience that pain and suffering have "something of an
apologetic function; that is, the church must 'try to meet man in a special way
on the path of his suffering."" 0 6 Effective apologetics, after all, wrestles
seriously with building bridges to surrounding pagan culture; it will not suffice
merely to cite Scripture or affirm Scriptural authority, as Protestant evangelicals
frequently have tended to do.
The former pontiff points out the limits of medicine, insofar as the science of
healing is uni-dimensional. 0 7 Humans suffer in a variety of ways. Their
anguish can be moral, psychological, and spiritual as well as physical. So, it is
inevitable that human beings are occupied by one perplexing question: Why do
we suffer? Although physical pain is widespread and measurable in the animal
kingdom, only humans reflect on the why question. This anguish is intensified
by the fact that no satisfactory answer is forthcoming.
0 8
For John Paul, no resource expresses so vividly the emotion, anxiety and
dissonance of human suffering as does the book of Job. And what is
particularly striking to the reader is the sheer amount of the story devoted to the
dialogue between Job and his acquaintances. Their task, as they understand it,
is to convince him that he must have done something seriously wrong, for
"suffering-they say-always strikes a man as punishment for a crime.' 10 9 In
102. Salvifici Doloris at § 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paul-ii/
apostletters/documents/hfjp-iiapll 1021984_salvifici-dolorisen.html [hereinafter Salvifici
Doloris] (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
103. Romans 8:22.
104. Salvifici Doloris, supra note 102, at § 2.
105. Id. at § 3.
106. Id.
107. At the same time, it is legitimate to argue that the task of medicine is to cure and care
even when it cannot heal. A basic ingredient in that caring process is palliative. See D.
Beauregard, The Mystery of Suffering, ETmcs & MED. 1-2 (Aug. 1995); J.F. Bresnahan,
Palliative Care or Assisted Suicide?, AM. 16-21 (Mar. 14, 1998).
108. Salvifici Doloris, supra note 102, at § 9.
109. Id. at § 10.
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this "theology of retribution," suffering only has meaning in the context of
moral justice, whereby evil is repaid for evil.
While much of the Old Testament in fact corroborates the retributive truth
that suffering is the direct result of evil, this explanation is incomplete and is
challenged by Job. That is, not the moral law of reaping and sowing is to be
rejected; rather, his "friends" application of this law to his own situation.
Hence, "it is not true that all suffering is a consequence of a fault," for Job is
not being punished." ° Rather, as the context of the story immediately
establishes, suffering in Job has the character of a test-a test to demonstrate
righteousness.
But there are problems. Although such a "stock Christian" answer has
validity, "at the same time it is seen to be not only unsatisfactory... but it even
seems to trivialize and impoverish" the notion of divine justice."' For John
Paul, a satisfactory "answer" to the problem of suffering can only be grasped
when it is tethered to "the entire revelation of the Old and above all the New
Covenant."" 12 Suffering, thus viewed, "must serve for conversion, that is, for
the rebuilding of goodness in the subject."' 13 In order to perceive the true
answer to the "why" of suffering, "we must look to the revelation of divine
love, to what God has done for man in the cross of Jesus Christ."'" 4
Because the very essence of Christian soteriology is liberation from evil,
herein we behold salvific love. The mission of the only-begotten Son consists
in conquering sin and death, by which "we have in mind not only evil and
definitive, eschatological suffering.., but also ... evil and suffering in their
temporal and historical dimension."' 15 Evil remains hound to sin and death.
Hence it is necessary that in his messianic ministry "Christ drew increasingly
closer to the world of human suffering. "He went about doing good, ' ' 16 and
his actions were directed primarily to those who were suffering and seeking
help."' 7 Moreover, because of his full awareness that his mission was to suffer
and die, Christ therefore severely rebuked Peter when the latter wished him to
abandon the thought of suffering and death."'
110. Id. at § 11.
111. Id. at § 11.
112. Id. at § 12.
113. Id. at § 12.
114. Id. at§ 13.
115. Id. at § 15. Here evangelical Protestants would do well to pay attention. In our recent
history we have stressed the eschatological over the temporal, with a deficient "theology of
creation"; hence, we have not always been responsible in the cultural mandate.
116. Acts 10:38.
117. Salvifici Doloris, supra note 102, at § 16.
118. Id.
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Thus, as innocent sufferer, Christ takes upon himself the sufferings of the
world. And this we call "substitutionary"---and above all, redemptive-
suffering. Christ has accomplished the world's redemption through his
suffering.1 9
John Paul wishes his audience to ponder the fact that "with the passion of
Christ all human suffering has found itself in a new situation. In the cross of
Christ not only is the redemption accomplished through suffering, but also
human suffering itself has been redeemed.' 20 To suffer, writes John Paul,
"means to become particularly susceptible, particularly open to the working of
the salvific powers of God offered to humanity through Christ."'
12 1
Despite its relative absence in our pulpits, our classrooms, our bookstores
and our study groups, the question of suffering nevertheless has "a special
value in the eyes of the church. It is something good, before which the church
bows down in reverence with all the depth of her faith in the redemption.'
'1 22
As the individual embraces suffering through the grace of the crucified
Redeemer, gradually, notes John Paul, the salvific meaning of suffering is
revealed.
123
Finally, and most significantly, in the thinking of John Paul the question of
suffering is inextricably linked to the parable of the Good Samaritan, 24 for it is
precisely the Samaritan who shows himself to be the real "neighbor" to the
victim.125 If the parable teaches anything, it teaches that we may not "pass by
on the other side" indifferently; rather, it underscores the redemptive character
of suffering by its condemnation of passivity. The Good Samaritan is "good"
because he has compassion and is sensitive to the sufferings of others."' 26 In
this concrete expression of the Samaritan's love, John Paul is convinced, "the
salvific meaning of suffering is completely accomplished and reaches its
definitive dimension." Namely, suffering is present in the world "in order to
release love, in order to give birth to works of love toward neighbor, in order to
transform the whole of human civilization.''
27
119. Id. at § 17.
120. Id. at § 19. For this reason Paul can write to the Corinthians, "For this slight
momentary affliction is preparing for its an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison...
2 Corinthians 4:17-18.
121. Salvifici Doloris, supra note 102, at § 23.
122. Id. at § 24.
123. Id. at § 26.
124. Luke 10:25-37.
125. Salvifici Doloris, supra note 102, at § 28-30.
126. Id. at § 28-30.
127. Id. at § 30. Although John Paul is sensitive to the isolation that suffering forces upon
the individual, the emphasis of his letter is conspicuously communal and ecclesial.
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C. Rethinking the Common Good
The common social good may be defined as the sum total of social
conditions that allow people to reach their fulfillment as human beings in
society. The Catholic Catechism identifies three components that compromise
the common good: (1) respect for the person as such; (2) the social well-being
and development of individuals and groups; and (3) the commodity of peace,
by which we mean the stability and security of a just order. 28
Because one's view of the "common good" depends on one's view of rights,
society stands or falls on its views of personhood and rights. Where there are
no universal moral truths, nothing fixed, personhood and dignity suffer. What
might Christians have to oiler in the way of public debate? Here we might keep
in mind John Paul's argument developed in Veritatis Splendor: if there is no
fixed truth, there can be no freedom or rights or dignity.
Freedom, John Paul warns, does not extend to the toleration of intrinsic evil,
and where the denial of universal moral truth is permitted to exist, the result is
that "law" is reduced to a function of "raw, totalitarian power.' 29 It matters not
"whether one is the master of the world or the 'poorest of the poor' on the face
of the earth. Before the demands of morality, we are all absolutely equal."'
130
How, John Paul asks, shall a society govern itself without recourse to universal
moral values? And how are government and the state to be conceived? "If
there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity," he cautions, then
"ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power."''
Democratic culture has been a wager, not a frozen accomplishment, writes
Jean Elshtain in her book Real Politics. It has been a wager
from Thomas Jefferson's bold throwing down of the gauntlet to the
British Empire, not knowing whether the upshot would be "hanging
together or hanged separately," to Lincoln's "nation thus conceived
and thus dedicated," to Martin Luther King's dream of an essentially
pacific democratic people who judge their fellow citizens by the
content of the character [and] not the color of their skins. ... 132
Hereby Elshtain wishes to underscore the importance of participation.
Responsible citizenship, as the reader will discover, is a recurring theme in
Elshtain's writings, and as an Augustinian scholar, she is ever-conscious of the
tension between faith and culture that imbues the work of this church father.
128. CCC, supra note 44, at § 1907-09.
129. Id. at § 96 and 99.
130. Id. at § 96.
131. Id. at § 101.
132. JEAN ELSHTAIN, REAL POLITICS 363 (1997).
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Augustine, of course, lived at a time very much like our own, a time of
considerable social and ideological upheaval. Indeed, culture was literally
crumbling before his eyes while he penned De civitate Dei. An important
subtheme in much of Augustine's work, not only in De civitate, is the tension
between our earthly and heavenly citizenship. Where our loyalties are
challenged by compromise, where the possibility of idolatry is present, our
ultimate allegiance is always to the heavenly city. However, as Christians we
retain dual citizenships, a reality implying that we are obligated to balance-
rather than eradicate-the tension between our duties in both realms, since
duties to both are divinely bequeathed.
The obligation to "occupy" responsibly, of course, is not an easy word for
fundamentalist or isolationist types to hear. Nor does it soothe those who are
cultural accommodationists, i.e., those who yearn for culture's acceptance. To
occupy responsibly requires of us spiritual discernment. As Christians we are
required by faith to eschew the twin errors of isolation and capitulation as it
relates to faith and culture. On the one hand, we reject the outlook that faith
and culture or politics or social involvement have little or nothing to do with
one another. This is the later-Tertullian error. On the other hand, we are
equally attentive to the idolatry that conflates faith and culture, politics, or
society. Both stances are idolatrous; both require our constant vigilance.
133
It is in response to this Augustinian burden, namely, to avoid both the flight
from culture and an absorption into culture, that much of Elshtain's work is
devoted. And this to her credit. Hence, we should not be surprised that the
strand of responsible citizenship laces its way through much of Elshtain's work.
The robust spiritedness of democratic culture, by its very nature and from its
origin, requires our active engagement in order to distinguish itself-and
remain distinguished-from other forms of political organization that tend
toward tyranny. While certainly one cannot participate in all aspects of civic
life, neither is one permitted to remain aloof and isolated from that civic life in
which he or she is embedded. For to do so is to forfeit, over time, the climate
that permits-indeed, fosters-those benefits and advantages of a democratic
versus dictatorial system.
Correlatively, and importantly, belonging to such a social system requires the
balancing of freedoms and responsibilities. Unquestionably, this runs counter
to the cultural Zeitgeist, given the fact that rights and freedoms always trump
duties in the present social-political climate. Nevertheless, to acknowledge our
moral accountability to an authority higher than self, to live in the shadow and
133. Elsewhere, I have attempted to apply the Augustinian outlook on citizenship to the
problem ofjustice, war and peace. See J. DARYL CHARLES, BETWEEN PACIFISM AND JMHAD: JUST
WAR AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION 37-45 (2005).
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circumference of self-evident "truths," is to embrace our responsibility toward
our neighbor. This responsibility is not actualized in the prayer closet,
important as prayer for the neighbor might be. While social responsibility
should be second-nature to all people espousing Christian faith, many
professing Christians remain remarkably disengaged from public service, even
when, to be sure, this "service" can take an infinite number of forms.134 Not
only is this service to others the evidence of true religion,135 it is the prerequisite
for maintaining the underpinnings of the democratic social order.
D. Rethinking Tolerance
Along with its siblings "diversity" and "compassion," "tolerance" has
achieved remarkable status in our culture's hierarchy of values. It is one of
those "thought-killer" words, as someone has remarked, that has come to
comprise our cultural lexicon, requiring uncritical acceptance for all seasons
and all reasons.' 36 In fact, the Commandment "Thou shalt not judge" seems to
have superseded all revealed commandments-even rationally discovered
ones. 137 But how far tolerance? And how is tolerance best understood'?
In the English language, tolerance in the sense of "bearing" or "indulging"
(Latin: tolerare) dates from the mid-eighteenth century. Originally, "tolerance"
denoted a policy of forbearance in the presence of something disliked or
disapproved. It was foremost a political virtue, demonstrated by a
government's readiness to permit a variety of religious beliefs. 38 The notion
that government should not enforce a specific religion comes to expression in
John Locke's Letter on Tolerance (1689) and Two Treatises of Government
(1690). Removed from its political context, tolerance gradually came to be
understood as a forbearance, an enduring, of those behaviors or practices that
we dislike. 1
39
134. One readily thinks, for example, of the disengagement of fundamentalists and a rather
large sector of Protestant evangelicalism.
135. Cf., e.g.,James 1:27.
136. See David Warren, Tolerance/Forgiveness, SUNDAY SPECTATOR (December 4,2005),
available at www.davidwarrenonline.com/index.php?artlD=546 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
137. Adam Wolfson, What Remains of Toleration?, PUB. INT. 40 (Winter 1999).
138. By way of analogy, one thinks, for example, of sectors within current-day resurgent
Islam which demand that the entire political and social order be founded on Sharia.
139. In a volume with the fascinating title The Long Truce: How Toleration Made the World
Safe for Power and Profit, A.J. Conyers has traced the modem history of the notion of tolerance
in an attempt to answer the question of whether tolerance can be considered a virtue, see A.J.
CONYER, THE LONG TRUCE: How TOLERATION MADE THE WORLD SAFE FOR POWER AND PROFIT
(2001). Conyer's answer is that, strictly speaking, it is not a virtue in the classical sense.
Rather, in his argument, it is to be viewed as a "strategy" or policy that directs virtues such as
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Tolerance in its conception took on the cast of a virtue because of its concern
for the common good and its respect for people as persons. We endure
particular customs, behaviors or habits-sometimes even (relatively) bad
habits-of people in the interest of preserving a greater unity. In the Lockean
context, tolerance was advocated for religious nonconformists. Never was it
construed, however, to imply-much less to sanction-morally questionable
behavior. Consider the devolution of a concept. What was a public virtue in its
prior state becomes a vice if and when it ceases to care for truth, ignores the
common good, and disdains the values that uphold a community. The culture
of "tolerance" in which we presently find ourselves is a culture in which people
believe nothing, possess no clear concept of right and wrong, and are
remarkably indifferent to this precarious state of affairs. 140 The challenge
facing people of faith is learning how to purify tolerance so that it remains a
virtue without succumbing to the centripetal forces of relativism.
Let us recall that tolerance, in our cultural tradition, emerged as a political
and social virtue. And as such, tolerance has private as well as public or
communal dimensions. While we may disagree with another's opinion, vice, or
lifestyle, we extend (in principle) that person's "right" to a specific opinion or
behavior we find objectionable. Christians and non-Christians of all varieties
tolerate one another's differences because of what they all share in common-
the laws of nature, inalienable rights, dignity that inheres in personhood.
When, however, a person-in the name of "tolerance"--is making claims on
the public square, tolerance must then cease, for we tolerate what we dislike
until it begins making claims on the wider community in a way that undermines
the common good. Thus, we are compelled to draw a strict distinction between
the freedoms of an individual, practiced in private, and the needs of the
community, of which we all are contributing parts. This distinction is not
necessarily owing to Christian insight, for Locke himself makes the basic
observation-an important one for contemporary Americans-that a great deal
of difference can be tolerated provided that it does not endanger social
cohesion.
But, in practical terms, what does this mean? With regard to objectionable
behavior, where exactly do we draw the line? How do we as a society
determine what behavior is acceptable and what is unacceptable? A well-wom
bit of conventional wisdom among religious folk is that we should "hate the sin
patience, humility, moderation and prudence to a desired end. In the end, the goodness of
tolerance is understood as depending entirely on the nature of the goods that it serves.
140. David Warren quips that tolerance is one of those ideas "loosely hatched" during the
Enlightenment but carried forward today by postmodernists "into the realm of dementia." See
Warren, supra note 136. It is hard to disagree with him.
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while loving the sinner." Granted, there is some truth to this maxim.
Nevertheless, as C. S. Lewis pointed out, this nice-sounding piece of piety can
easily descend into sloppy sentimentalism. Lewis observes that to love the
sinner in fact means that we feel toward him
as we feel about ourselves-to wish that he were not bad, to hope
that he may, in this world or another, be cured: in fact, to wish his
good. That is what is meant in the Bible by loving him: wishing his
good, not feeling fond of him nor saying he is nice when he is
not. 141
Lewis's advice appropriately parallels the New Testament admonition to "speak
the truth in love. 142 To speak the truth in love is to embody a moral honesty
that refuses to compromise the consequences of ultimate reality, while it
simultaneously is cognizant of the fact that fellow human beings are to be
treated as bearers of the image of God. Love and truth are not mutually
exclusive, despite the ethical propaganda that emanates from common culture.
Those who would call us to "love the sinner" frequently really mean that we
should sympathize non-judgmentally with him, by which they mean, we should
refrain from stigmatizing and expressing disapproval. The person, then, will
feel better. But as one social critic has quipped, this attitude only "makes the
world safe for moral dereliction. ' 1
43
If "tolerance" and "compassion" are not rooted in moral principle, they end
up corrupting both the practitioner and the object. Elevating them to the status
of cardinal virtues, while disengaging them from unbending moral realities,
sends the signal to the unscrupulous that
a good strategy for getting their way is to play on other people's
pity, which is dreadfully destructive to character. It encourages
malingering, self-pity, and claims of victimhood. It encourages not
self-sufficiency, but dependence... ; not strength, but weakness;
not honesty and integrity, but shameless and vicious exploitation of
others; not cheerfulness in adversity, but whining: not acceptance of
life's vicissitudes, but a readiness to find fault. .44
But we return to the nagging question of drawing the line. As to precisely
where Christians are to draw the line, our answer is this: we must draw the line
141. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 108 (Macmillan 1960) (1944).
142. Ephesians 4:15.
143. John Attarian, In Dispraise of Tolerance, Sensitivity and Compassion, THE
SocIAL Crnc 16 (Spring 1998).
144. Id. at 18.
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where private preferences that undermine the communal good make claims in
thepublic sphere. Are Christians called to tolerate an individual whose sexual
behavior differs? Indeed. Are Christians called to tolerate the theoretical and
practical promotion of that behavior in the form of social or public policy? By
no means. Whereas sexuality is a private matter, educating on human sexuality
(at least through a public tax-supported institution) ceases to be private; it is
very much a public and communal concern.
145
Therefore, whatever the cost and inconvenience, Christians are not only free
to contend, they are required to do so, and thatfor the purposes ofpreserving
social cohesion and the moral order.146 This response, of course, will lead to
charges that we are "imposing" our morality on those around us. Christians are
reminded ad nauseum by secularists that because we live in a pluralistic
democracy, we are forbidden from such imposition. But are we?
If morality is indeed a private matter as some contend, then critics of
Christianity would be justified in excluding the voice of Christian ethics from
the public square. But since the square is public, that means that all may
contend especially those of Christian faith. In the last two decades vigorous
debate has transpired between professors of law, political scientists, and
philosophers over inter-locking questions of justice, the public square, and
moral neutrality. The strongest advocates of "tolerance" in our day insist on the
idea that the public square is morally neutral. And because it is thought to be
neutral, therefore the state must "remain neutral in adjudicating various claims
to "rights." But is there such a thing as moral neutrality?
If there are particular goods identified by a society that needs protecting,
then society cannot be "neutral" with regard to those goods. It has a vested
interest in maintaining and preserving them. And those goods, of course, are
established on the basis of what a society considers to be ultimate and
authoritative. Moral neutrality is neither self-evident nor self-justifying; rather,
it must be shown to be true or correct. When its proponents press their
argument in the public square for a particular position-for example, on the
nature of the family or marriage, same-sex unions, free speech, or abortion
rights-they argue that competing notions are controversial, mistaken, and
therefore to be rejected. Thus, "moral neutrality" is much like moral relativism
insofar as its proponents demonstrate through arguments for or against
145. A brief but excellent overview of the limitations of tolerance within the communal
context as well as the contours of Christian responsibility are found in Kent Weber, How Far Is
Tolerance a Virtue?, REGENERATION QuARTERLY 29-31 (Winter 1996).
146. Adopting the appropriate language with which to contend, however, is of vital
importance.
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competing moral positions the falsehood of its alleged existence. 147
We must in this context stress the symbiosis between tolerance and the
common good. Tolerance as an authentic virtue is rooted in a commitment to
what is true and good for society; correlatively, as a vice it is indifferent to these
realities. Therefore, tolerance is not-indeed, cannot be-neutral toward what
affects society. Even staunchly secular approaches to public and political life
themselves are thoroughly religious in nature. That is to say, they arise out of
deeply held or binding commitments (from the Latin verb religiare, "to bind")
to what they believe to be right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable. Any
comprehensive orientation toward life has an inherently "religious" character,
and every political and legal mode of reasoning begins and ends with
fundamental assumptions, precommitments, and preconceptions about the
origin and nature of life.
148
But what we are prepared to tolerate pivots, as we have sought to emphasize,
on what is ultimate-in our personal lives and in the life of culture. There is
something ultimate before which every person-indeed, every society-will
bow. Modem and postmodem idolatries abound, but there is no escaping the
fact that everyone has a hierarchy of values. What society tolerates is
predicated on this hierarchy, atop which sits something ultimate. Social
consensus is possible where there are overlapping realms of agreed-upon moral-
social capital. Where there is no overlapping agreement, consensus is
impossible, and anarchy is invited.
49
But let us proceed one step farther. By contending that there is no such
thing as moral neutrality, we are also declaring that someone's morality will be
imposed. Francis Canavan has expressed it this way: "it is an old half-truth that
you cannot legislate morality. The other and more significant half of the truth
147. J. Budziszewski, The Illusion of Moral Neutrally, FIRST THINGS 32-37
(August/September 1993), has pointed out that intolerance-ironically furthered by the
"tolerance police" of our day-demonstrates itself in two ways-through a "softheadedness,"
i.e., through excessive indulgence that is morally spineless, and through the opposite extreme of
narrowmindedness."
148. JAMES SKILLEN, RECHARGING THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 30-33 (1994), argues this
point quite succinctly. For a more extensive treatment of "neutrality," see Roy CLOUSER, THE
MYTH OF RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE HIDDEN ROLE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN
THEOInES (1991).
149. Hence, as James Davidson Hunter, in his book Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America, and J. Budziszewski, in True Tolerance: Liberalism and the Necessity of Judgment,
have attempted to demonstrate, the metaphor of "culture wars" is no mere metaphor; at stake is
the clash of two competing, all-encompassing visions for humanity and society. JAMES
DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1990), and J.
BtDz zEwsKI, IN TRUE TOLERANCE: LIERALISM AND THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT (1992).
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is that a society's laws inevitably reflect its morals and its religion. As a
society's religious and moral beliefs change, then, so will its laws."' 50
Therefore, we must expose the falsehood of the philosophical and sociological
notion that a pluralistic society can be neutral on moral matters, since this
thinking inevitably leads to the establishing of the most secularized,
materialistic, and hedonistic elements of the population. In other words,
ultimately someone's morality will be legislated.151 Two examples of this
moral reasoning may suffice to illustrate. If someone claims the "right to die,"
society is morally constrained to respond on the basis of the natural law: as an
objective "good," human life has intrinsic value that must be protected by the
state (if the state is legitimate). Neutrality is not an option, permitting right-to-
die advocates the luxury of finding a constitutional "right to privacy."
Likewise, in response to homosexual activists who insist gay marriage as a
"civil right" on par with heterosexual marriages, we might argue that neither
government nor the public can seek refuge in a purported "neutrality," since
there exist a particular "nature" and function of human activity that are
consensually demonstrable throughout human civilization.
The fathers of the American experiment assumed that people will broadly
agree on rationally discernible moral norms, a consensusjuris, that will inform
a society's understanding of rights, justice, good, and evil. This consensus, it
should he noted, guards against a tyranny of both the minority and the majority,
since "tyranny" per se is a fundamental violation of human (i.e., natural) rights
that are inalienable. There is, then, no moral "neutrality" as envisioned by the
framers of this nation's charter documents: in the interest of all of society,
particular goods" will need to be defended.
Thus, the public nature of the marketplace (of both ideas and goods), then
and now, as well as of social institutions, coupled with the very public nature of
requisite Christian witness (then and now), compels people of Christian faith to
work for the common good using any and all means, so long as democratic
pluralism resists the centripetal slide into a soft form of totalitarian statism. 152
150. Francis Canavan, Pluralism and the Limits ofNeutrality, in THE BATTLE FOR MORALrrY
IN PLuRALISTIC America 158 (C. Horn ed., 1985).
151. Canavan writes: "If we are a plurality of communities," the right "to maintain and
transmit the community's beliefs and values is at least as important as the right of the individual
to live as he pleases." Id. at 160-61.
152. In response to the potential objection that a balance of power-namely, judicial,
executive and legislative-excludes the possibility of political tyranny of various degrees in the
U.S., I would simply pose the following question: What if all three branches of "democratic"
government, mirroring the values of elitist culture, are (more or less) committed to a bleaching
of the religious viewpoint and an eradication of Christian participation in the moral, legal as
well as political process?
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For those of us who tend to shy away from confrontation, the hard truth is this:
a society
cannot function well, cannot survive, and cannot protect the
innocent . . . from harm and evil, without a large measure of
intolerance. Yes, intolerance-of theft, burglary, cruelty, classroom
hooliganism, disrespect for parental authority, and violent crime of
all sorts; of substance abuse, infidelity, illegitimacy, perversion,
pornography, rape, and child molestation; of fraud, envy,
covetousness, and knavery; of sloth, mediocrity, incompetence,
maleducation, improvidence, irresponsibility and fecklessness. A
society tolerant of those things would soon find itself in serious
trouble, even facing dissolution, and many people in that society
would be in peril of their lives.
153
Everyone has claims on the public square-most notably, Christians, whose
cultural mandate rests on a firm commitment to the redemption of all things.1
54
While it is not a "given" that everyone's claim will be "tolerated," tolerance
properly understood mirrors a strong and principled commitment to promote
moral truth and work for the common good.'55
VI. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
From the standpoint of faith, the truth about nature and natural revelation
matters. And while government cannot impose by decree moral truth, this truth
should nevertheless be debated in the public square, if, for no other reason, it is
intuited by all human beings. The alternative is an unhuman-and inhumane-
consensus of "choice" and degradation of life.
Our mandate, therefore, as people of faith, is not to "shrink the truth to the
point that even a postmodernist can bear it," in the words of one social critic.'
15 6
Rather, it is to contend for moral "first things" in a manner that accords with
our inherent dignity as human beings-beings who mirror the imago Dei.
"Man has been given a sublime dignity based on the intimate bond which
153. Attarian, supra note 143, at 22.
154. Colossians 1:17-20; cf Ephesians 1:10.
155. Recent volumes that commend themselves to the reader are JOSEPH CARDINAL
RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS (2004), and
BRAD STETSON AND JOSEPH G. CONTI, THE TRUTH TOLERANCE: PLURALISM, DwERSITY, AND THE
CULTuRE WARS (2005).
156. Stephen A. Long, Reproductive Technologies and the Natural Law *10, NATIONAL
CATHOLIC BIOETHICS CENTER, available at http://ncbcenter.metapress.com/media/64crqnv
wyl2kl 1I4fatn/contributions/g/0/l/n/g01n14376202x573.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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unites him to his Creator," John Paul has argued with considerable force. In the
human person, "there shines forth a reflection of God himself .... The
sacredness of life gives rise to its inviolability, written from the beginning in
man's heart, in his conscience."' 5 7 Therefore, responsible participation in
pressing ethical and bioethical debates of the day will necessitate our
commitment to safeguard human life at all junctures, since life is to be
absolutely respected.
If nature itself cannot instruct us about what is ethically permissible and
impermissible, and our borrowed social and moral capital cannot be sustained,
how will our society proceed ethically? Leon Kass has framed it this way:
how, for example, will we be able to judge whether increasing the
human life span, say, to 150 years, will be humanizing or
dehumanizing; whether an alterable genetic predisposition toward
homosexuality ... [if diagnosable in utero] ought to be regarded as
a treatable condition; whether we will be better or worse off with a
perfected pharmacology of pleasure? In short, how, in a world
morally neutered by the effect of objectified science, will we know
which genetic or functional or behavioral alterations of human
nature we should welcome as improvements?'58
In the end, heaven and earth cry out against grandiose visions of unbridled
autonomy and human lawlessness. Notwithstanding all that changes, the
natural law will remain.
157. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae § 34, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_
father/john_paul ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii-enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae en.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
158. KAss, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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